155 lines
4.7 KiB
Diff
155 lines
4.7 KiB
Diff
From 099016b7e8d70a6d5dd814e788bba08d33d48426 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
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Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:41:16 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Protect array_list_del_idx against size_t overflow.
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If the assignment of stop overflows due to idx and count being
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larger than SIZE_T_MAX in sum, out of boundary access could happen.
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It takes invalid usage of this function for this to happen, but
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I decided to add this check so array_list_del_idx is as safe against
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bad usage as the other arraylist functions.
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---
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arraylist.c | 3 +++
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
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diff --git arraylist.c arraylist.c
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index 12ad8af6d3..e5524aca75 100644
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--- arraylist.c
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+++ arraylist.c
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@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ int array_list_del_idx(struct array_list *arr, size_t idx, size_t count)
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{
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size_t i, stop;
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+ /* Avoid overflow in calculation with large indices. */
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+ if (idx > SIZE_T_MAX - count)
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+ return -1;
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stop = idx + count;
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if (idx >= arr->length || stop > arr->length)
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return -1;
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From 77d935b7ae7871a1940cd827e850e6063044ec45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
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Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:46:45 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Prevent division by zero in linkhash.
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If a linkhash with a size of zero is created, then modulo operations
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are prone to division by zero operations.
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Purely protective measure against bad usage.
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---
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linkhash.c | 3 +++
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
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diff --git linkhash.c linkhash.c
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index 7ea58c0abf..f05cc38030 100644
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--- linkhash.c
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+++ linkhash.c
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@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
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#include "config.h"
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+#include <assert.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <stddef.h>
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@@ -499,6 +500,8 @@ struct lh_table *lh_table_new(int size, lh_entry_free_fn *free_fn, lh_hash_fn *h
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int i;
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struct lh_table *t;
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+ /* Allocate space for elements to avoid divisions by zero. */
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+ assert(size > 0);
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t = (struct lh_table *)calloc(1, sizeof(struct lh_table));
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if (!t)
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return NULL;
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From d07b91014986900a3a75f306d302e13e005e9d67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
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Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:47:25 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Fix integer overflows.
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The data structures linkhash and printbuf are limited to 2 GB in size
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due to a signed integer being used to track their current size.
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If too much data is added, then size variable can overflow, which is
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an undefined behaviour in C programming language.
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Assuming that a signed int overflow just leads to a negative value,
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like it happens on many sytems (Linux i686/amd64 with gcc), then
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printbuf is vulnerable to an out of boundary write on 64 bit systems.
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---
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linkhash.c | 7 +++++--
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printbuf.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
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2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
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diff --git linkhash.c linkhash.c
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index f05cc38030..51e90b13a2 100644
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--- linkhash.c
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+++ linkhash.c
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@@ -580,9 +580,12 @@ int lh_table_insert_w_hash(struct lh_table *t, const void *k, const void *v, con
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{
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unsigned long n;
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- if (t->count >= t->size * LH_LOAD_FACTOR)
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- if (lh_table_resize(t, t->size * 2) != 0)
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+ if (t->count >= t->size * LH_LOAD_FACTOR) {
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+ /* Avoid signed integer overflow with large tables. */
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+ int new_size = INT_MAX / 2 < t->size ? t->size * 2 : INT_MAX;
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+ if (t->size == INT_MAX || lh_table_resize(t, new_size) != 0)
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return -1;
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+ }
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n = h % t->size;
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diff --git printbuf.c printbuf.c
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index 976c12dde5..00822fac4f 100644
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--- printbuf.c
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+++ printbuf.c
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@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
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#include "config.h"
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+#include <limits.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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@@ -65,10 +66,16 @@ static int printbuf_extend(struct printbuf *p, int min_size)
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if (p->size >= min_size)
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return 0;
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-
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- new_size = p->size * 2;
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- if (new_size < min_size + 8)
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+ /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */
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+ if (min_size > INT_MAX - 8)
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+ return -1;
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+ if (p->size > INT_MAX / 2)
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new_size = min_size + 8;
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+ else {
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+ new_size = p->size * 2;
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+ if (new_size < min_size + 8)
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+ new_size = min_size + 8;
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+ }
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#ifdef PRINTBUF_DEBUG
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MC_DEBUG("printbuf_memappend: realloc "
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"bpos=%d min_size=%d old_size=%d new_size=%d\n",
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@@ -83,6 +90,9 @@ static int printbuf_extend(struct printbuf *p, int min_size)
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int printbuf_memappend(struct printbuf *p, const char *buf, int size)
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{
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+ /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */
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+ if (size > INT_MAX - p->bpos - 1)
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+ return -1;
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if (p->size <= p->bpos + size + 1)
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{
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if (printbuf_extend(p, p->bpos + size + 1) < 0)
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@@ -100,6 +110,9 @@ int printbuf_memset(struct printbuf *pb, int offset, int charvalue, int len)
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if (offset == -1)
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offset = pb->bpos;
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+ /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */
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+ if (len > INT_MAX - offset)
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+ return -1;
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size_needed = offset + len;
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if (pb->size < size_needed)
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{
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