void-packages/srcpkgs/libsasl/patches/CVE-2013-4122.patch
2014-07-25 16:34:30 +02:00

116 lines
3.7 KiB
Diff

From dedad73e5e7a75d01a5f3d5a6702ab8ccd2ff40d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mancha <mancha1@hush.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2013 09:08:07 +0000
Subject: Handle NULL returns from glibc 2.17+ crypt()
Starting with glibc 2.17 (eglibc 2.17), crypt() fails with EINVAL
(w/ NULL return) if the salt violates specifications. Additionally,
on FIPS-140 enabled Linux systems, DES/MD5-encrypted passwords
passed to crypt() fail with EPERM (w/ NULL return).
When using glibc's crypt(), check return value to avoid a possible
NULL pointer dereference.
Patch by mancha1@hush.com.
---
diff --git a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
index 4b34222..400289c 100644
--- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
+++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ char *userid;
char *password;
{
char* r;
+ char* crpt_passwd;
struct passwd *pwd;
pwd = getpwnam(userid);
@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ char *password;
else if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '*') {
r = "Account disabled";
}
- else if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) != 0) {
+ else if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) || strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {
r = "Incorrect password";
}
else {
diff --git a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
index 2b11286..6d607bb 100644
--- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
+++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
@@ -32,13 +32,15 @@ char *userid;
char *password;
{
struct spwd *pwd;
+ char *crpt_passwd;
pwd = getspnam(userid);
if (!pwd) {
return "Userid not found";
}
- if (strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp)) != 0) {
+ crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp);
+ if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {
return "Incorrect password";
}
else {
diff --git a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
index fc8029d..d4ebe54 100644
--- a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
+++ b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ auth_getpwent (
{
/* VARIABLES */
struct passwd *pw; /* pointer to passwd file entry */
+ char *crpt_passwd; /* encrypted password */
int errnum;
/* END VARIABLES */
@@ -105,7 +106,8 @@ auth_getpwent (
}
}
- if (strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd))) {
+ crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd);
+ if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd)) {
if (flags & VERBOSE) {
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_getpwent: %s: invalid password", login);
}
diff --git a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
index 677131b..1988afd 100644
--- a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
+++ b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
@@ -210,8 +210,8 @@ auth_shadow (
RETURN("NO Insufficient permission to access NIS authentication database (saslauthd)");
}
- cpw = strdup((const char *)crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp));
- if (strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, cpw)) {
+ cpw = crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp);
+ if (!cpw || strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, (const char *)cpw)) {
if (flags & VERBOSE) {
/*
* This _should_ reveal the SHADOW_PW_LOCKED prefix to an
@@ -221,10 +221,8 @@ auth_shadow (
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_shadow: pw mismatch: '%s' != '%s'",
sp->sp_pwdp, cpw);
}
- free(cpw);
RETURN("NO Incorrect password");
}
- free(cpw);
/*
* The following fields will be set to -1 if:
@@ -286,7 +284,7 @@ auth_shadow (
RETURN("NO Invalid username");
}
- if (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) != 0) {
+ if (!(cpw = crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) || (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, (const char *)cpw) != 0)) {
if (flags & VERBOSE) {
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "auth_shadow: pw mismatch: %s != %s",
password, upw->upw_passwd);
--
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