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libexif: update to 0.6.22.

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This commit is contained in:
Benjamín Albiñana 2020-06-19 20:29:41 +02:00 committed by Piotr
parent 2bb4f7d872
commit c848c5618b
4 changed files with 12 additions and 236 deletions
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29
srcpkgs/libexif/patches/CVE-2017-7544.patch
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@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
From c39acd1692023b26290778a02a9232c873f9d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de>
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:38:56 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] On saving makernotes, make sure the makernote container tags
has a type with 1 byte components.
Fixes (at least):
https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/130
https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/129
---
libexif/exif-data.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
index 67df4db..91f4c33 100644
--- a/libexif/exif-data.c
+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
@@ -255,6 +255,12 @@ exif_data_save_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *e,
exif_mnote_data_set_offset (data->priv->md, *ds - 6);
exif_mnote_data_save (data->priv->md, &e->data, &e->size);
e->components = e->size;
+ if (exif_format_get_size (e->format) != 1) {
+ /* e->format is taken from input code,
+ * but we need to make sure it is a 1 byte
+ * entity due to the multiplication below. */
+ e->format = EXIF_FORMAT_UNDEFINED;
+ }
}
}

115
srcpkgs/libexif/patches/CVE-2018-20030.patch
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@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
From 6aa11df549114ebda520dde4cdaea2f9357b2c89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Fandrich <dan@coneharvesters.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2018 16:01:45 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Improve deep recursion detection in
exif_data_load_data_content.
The existing detection was still vulnerable to pathological cases
causing DoS by wasting CPU. The new algorithm takes the number of tags
into account to make it harder to abuse by cases using shallow recursion
but with a very large number of tags. This improves on commit 5d28011c
which wasn't sufficient to counter this kind of case.
The limitation in the previous fix was discovered by Laurent Delosieres,
Secunia Research at Flexera (Secunia Advisory SA84652) and is assigned
the identifier CVE-2018-20030.
---
NEWS | 1 +
libexif/exif-data.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
index e35403d..a6f9c94 100644
--- a/libexif/exif-data.c
+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <libexif/olympus/exif-mnote-data-olympus.h>
#include <libexif/pentax/exif-mnote-data-pentax.h>
+#include <math.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -350,6 +351,20 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) { \
break; \
}
+/*! Calculate the recursion cost added by one level of IFD loading.
+ *
+ * The work performed is related to the cost in the exponential relation
+ * work=1.1**cost
+ */
+static unsigned int
+level_cost(unsigned int n)
+{
+ static const double log_1_1 = 0.09531017980432493;
+
+ /* Adding 0.1 protects against the case where n==1 */
+ return ceil(log(n + 0.1)/log_1_1);
+}
+
/*! Load data for an IFD.
*
* \param[in,out] data #ExifData
@@ -357,13 +372,13 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) { \
* \param[in] d pointer to buffer containing raw IFD data
* \param[in] ds size of raw data in buffer at \c d
* \param[in] offset offset into buffer at \c d at which IFD starts
- * \param[in] recursion_depth number of times this function has been
- * recursively called without returning
+ * \param[in] recursion_cost factor indicating how expensive this recursive
+ * call could be
*/
static void
exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
const unsigned char *d,
- unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_depth)
+ unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_cost)
{
ExifLong o, thumbnail_offset = 0, thumbnail_length = 0;
ExifShort n;
@@ -378,9 +393,20 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
if ((((int)ifd) < 0) || ( ((int)ifd) >= EXIF_IFD_COUNT))
return;
- if (recursion_depth > 30) {
+ if (recursion_cost > 170) {
+ /*
+ * recursion_cost is a logarithmic-scale indicator of how expensive this
+ * recursive call might end up being. It is an indicator of the depth of
+ * recursion as well as the potential for worst-case future recursive
+ * calls. Since it's difficult to tell ahead of time how often recursion
+ * will occur, this assumes the worst by assuming every tag could end up
+ * causing recursion.
+ * The value of 170 was chosen to limit typical EXIF structures to a
+ * recursive depth of about 6, but pathological ones (those with very
+ * many tags) to only 2.
+ */
exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData",
- "Deep recursion detected!");
+ "Deep/expensive recursion detected!");
return;
}
@@ -422,15 +448,18 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
switch (tag) {
case EXIF_TAG_EXIF_IFD_POINTER:
CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_EXIF);
- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o,
+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
break;
case EXIF_TAG_GPS_INFO_IFD_POINTER:
CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_GPS);
- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o,
+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
break;
case EXIF_TAG_INTEROPERABILITY_IFD_POINTER:
CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY);
- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o,
+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
break;
case EXIF_TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT:
thumbnail_offset = o;

85
srcpkgs/libexif/patches/CVE-2019-9278.patch
View file

@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
From 75aa73267fdb1e0ebfbc00369e7312bac43d0566 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2020 09:29:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2019-9278
avoid the use of unsafe integer overflow checking constructs (unsigned integer operations cannot overflow, so "u1 + u2 > u1" can be optimized away)
check for the actual sizes, which should also handle the overflows
document other places google patched, but do not seem relevant due to other restrictions
fixes https://github.com/libexif/libexif/issues/26
---
libexif/exif-data.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
index a6f9c94..6332cd1 100644
--- a/libexif/exif-data.c
+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
@@ -192,9 +192,15 @@ exif_data_load_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *entry,
doff = offset + 8;
/* Sanity checks */
- if ((doff + s < doff) || (doff + s < s) || (doff + s > size)) {
+ if (doff >= size) {
exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
- "Tag data past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size);
+ "Tag starts past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff, size);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s > size - doff) {
+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
+ "Tag data goes past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size);
return 0;
}
@@ -315,13 +321,14 @@ exif_data_load_data_thumbnail (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d,
unsigned int ds, ExifLong o, ExifLong s)
{
/* Sanity checks */
- if ((o + s < o) || (o + s < s) || (o + s > ds) || (o > ds)) {
- exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
- "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u) or size (%u).",
- o, s);
+ if (o >= ds) {
+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u).", o);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (s > ds - o) {
+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail size (%u), max would be %u.", s, ds-o);
return;
}
-
if (data->data)
exif_mem_free (data->priv->mem, data->data);
if (!(data->data = exif_data_alloc (data, s))) {
@@ -947,7 +954,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
"IFD 0 at %i.", (int) offset);
- /* Sanity check the offset, being careful about overflow */
+ /* ds is restricted to 16 bit above, so offset is restricted too, and offset+8 should not overflow. */
if (offset > ds || offset + 6 + 2 > ds)
return;
@@ -956,6 +963,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
/* IFD 1 offset */
n = exif_get_short (d + 6 + offset, data->priv->order);
+ /* offset < 2<<16, n is 16 bit at most, so this op will not overflow */
if (offset + 6 + 2 + 12 * n + 4 > ds)
return;
@@ -964,8 +972,8 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
"IFD 1 at %i.", (int) offset);
- /* Sanity check. */
- if (offset > ds || offset + 6 > ds) {
+ /* Sanity check. ds is ensured to be above 6 above, offset is 16bit */
+ if (offset > ds - 6) {
exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA,
"ExifData", "Bogus offset of IFD1.");
} else {

19
srcpkgs/libexif/template
View file

@ -1,16 +1,21 @@
# Template file for 'libexif'
pkgname=libexif
version=0.6.21
revision=7
version=0.6.22
revision=1
wrksrc="libexif-libexif-${version//./_}-release"
build_style=gnu-configure
configure_args="ac_cv_path_DOXYGEN=false"
hostmakedepends="automake libtool glib-devel gettext gettext-devel"
short_desc="EXIF file library"
maintainer="Orphaned <orphan@voidlinux.org>"
maintainer="Benjamín Albiñana <benalb@gmail.com>"
license="LGPL-2.1-or-later"
homepage="http://sourceforge.net/projects/libexif"
distfiles="${SOURCEFORGE_SITE}/${pkgname}/${pkgname}-${version}.tar.bz2"
checksum=16cdaeb62eb3e6dfab2435f7d7bccd2f37438d21c5218ec4e58efa9157d4d41a
patch_args="-Np1"
homepage="https://github.com/libexif/libexif"
distfiles="https://github.com/libexif/libexif/archive/${pkgname}-${version//./_}-release.tar.gz"
checksum=46498934b7b931526fdee8fd8eb77a1dddedd529d5a6dbce88daf4384baecc54
pre_configure() {
autoreconf -if
}
libexif-devel_package() {
depends="${sourcepkg}>=${version}_${revision}"