openssl: update to 1.0.1e.

srcpkgs/openssl/patches/Fix-IV-check-and-padding-removal.patch

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-From 32cc2479b473c49ce869e57fded7e9a77b695c0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
-Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 21:06:37 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix IV check and padding removal.
-
-Fix the calculation that checks there is enough room in a record
-after removing padding and optional explicit IV. (by Steve)
-
-For AEAD remove the correct number of padding bytes (by Andy)
----
- ssl/s3_cbc.c | 33 ++++++++++++---------------------
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/s3_cbc.c
-index ce77acd..0f60507 100644
---- ssl/s3_cbc.c
-+++ ssl/s3_cbc.c
-@@ -139,31 +139,22 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
-			    unsigned mac_size)
-	{
-	unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
--	const char has_explicit_iv =
--		s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION;
--	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ +
--				  mac_size +
--				  (has_explicit_iv ? block_size : 0);
--
--	/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
--	 * time. */
--	if (overhead > rec->length)
--		return 0;
--
--	/* We can always safely skip the explicit IV. We check at the beginning
--	 * of this function that the record has at least enough space for the
--	 * IV, MAC and padding length byte. (These can be checked in
--	 * non-constant time because it's all public information.) So, if the
--	 * padding was invalid, then we didn't change |rec->length| and this is
--	 * safe. If the padding was valid then we know that we have at least
--	 * overhead+padding_length bytes of space and so this is still safe
--	 * because overhead accounts for the explicit IV. */
--	if (has_explicit_iv)
-+	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
-+	/* Check if version requires explicit IV */
-+	if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
-		{
-+		/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in
-+		 * non-constant time.
-+		 */
-+		if (overhead + block_size > rec->length)
-+			return 0;
-+		/* We can now safely skip explicit IV */
-		rec->data += block_size;
-		rec->input += block_size;
-		rec->length -= block_size;
-		}
-+	else if (overhead > rec->length)
-+		return 0;
-
-	padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
-
-@@ -190,7 +181,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
-	if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
-		{
-		/* padding is already verified */
--		rec->length -= padding_length;
-+		rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
-		return 1;
-		}
-
---
-1.8.1.2

srcpkgs/openssl/template

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 # Template file for 'openssl'
 pkgname=openssl
 _openssl_version=1.0.1
-version=${_openssl_version}d
-revision=3
+version=${_openssl_version}e
+revision=1
 fulldepends="perl"
 crossmakedepends="zlib-devel"
 conf_files="/etc/ssl/openssl.cnf"
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ maintainer="Juan RP <xtraeme@gmail.com>"
 license="BSD"
 homepage="http://www.openssl.org/"
 distfiles="https://www.openssl.org/source/$pkgname-$version.tar.gz"
-checksum=88a423f9b08a994054583691b968815875580e12df754e881d7cfe9f1bd1f49d
+checksum=f74f15e8c8ff11aa3d5bb5f276d202ec18d7246e95f961db76054199c69c1ae3
 
 make_dirs="
 /etc/ssl/certs 0755 root root